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Abstract
The last years have seen a growing concern on the security of information systems and,
consequently, a call to arms for including security aspects during the entire development
process. Unfortunately, most proposals treat security in system-oriented terms and model
information systems through the policies and security mechanisms they supports. In con-
trast, attackers move around such security measures by exploiting weaknesses of the orga-
nization as a whole. Many weaknesses are due to the presence of conflicts in functional and
security requirements at organizational level. In this paper we show how the Secure Tropos
requirements engineering methodology can be used to model such conflicts in a concrete case
study: the fraud at Allied Irish Bank. In particular, the paper analyzes the vulnerabilities
affecting the organization and information system of Allied Irish Bank and its subsidiary
First Maryland Bancorp, that were exploited by a currency trader in order to fraudulently
cover $700 million losses.
1 Introduction
The last years have seen a growing effort for integrating security into the system development
process (Doan et al., 2004; Lodderstedt et al., 2002; McDermott and Fox, 1999; Schumacher,
2003; Sindre and Opdahl, 2005; van Lamsweerde et al., 2003). The basic idea underlying many of
these proposals is to integrate security concerns into the information system through the authen-
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tication and access control mechanisms supported by the information system itself. However, this
approach introduces a gap between security measures and the requirements of the organization
as a whole where the information systems are embedded. In other words, security mechanisms
are fitted into a pre-existing functional design which may not be able to accommodate them
due to potential conflicts with functional requirements. We argue that RE methodologies should
model and analyze organizations and their operational procedures and not just IT systems, and
then derive security policies and mechanisms from the requirements analysis process. Indeed a
major source of security weaknesses is the conflicts between functional and security requirements
which overlap the organization and the IT system. As such the IT system designer will not spot
it nor it will be detected by the manager in charge of the procedures.
To detect the presence of conflicts in requirements we need an accurate analysis of the struc-
ture of organizations, and so vulnerabilities could be not introduced in the system. Otherwise,
attackers might exploit such vulnerabilities for bypassing security mechanisms. Internal attacks
are even more harmful than external attacks since they are being performed by allegedly trusted
users that can easily move around access control mechanisms precisely because they are trusted.
So, trust plays a key role in the development of secure information systems.
Yet, very few security engineering methodologies take into account trust aspects. This mod-
elling absence affects the decision on the security measures imposed on the system. In particular,
such measures might be excessive in some cases and inadequate in others. For instance, system
designers may not introduce security measures since they may implicitly assume trust relation-
ships among users, that are not in the domain. Alternatively, system designers may introduce
expensive mechanisms for protecting a trusted system that has not been perceived as a trusted
system by the designers themself. To solve this problem, designers should model the organiza-
tional settings in terms of social relationships among the actors involved in the system.
In previous work (Giorgini et al., 2005a; Giorgini et al., 2005c) jointly with P. Giorgini
and J. Mylopoulos we have proposed Secure Tropos, a requirements engineering methodology
tailored to model both the organizational environment of a system and the system itself with
respect to functional and security requirements. This framework is founded on the notions of
ownership, trust, and delegation in order to defines entitlements, capabilities and responsabilities
of system’s actors. Together with a graphical modeling framework, the authors also proposed
a formal framework based on Datalog (Leone et al., 2005) that allows system designers for an
automatic analysis of the system requirements.
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Although the application of Secure Tropos to different case studies (e.g. (Massacci et al.,
2005)) has revealed its ability to identify conflicts among functional and security requirements at
organizational level, we notice that conflicts might conceal into requirements specified at different
levels (Giorgini et al., 2005b). Essentially, modeling and analyzing only the structure of the
organization could be not sufficient to state that the system is secure. Actually, retrospectively
untrusted agents can play trusted roles of the organization in order to gain personal advantage
from their position in the organization itself. This shows that comparing the structure of the
organization with the concrete instance of the organization (i.e. the agents that playing some
roles in the organization and relations among them) is needed to bring conflicts to light.
1.1 The contribution of this paper
This paper presents an application of the Secure Tropos methodology to a real case study con-
cerning the fraud to the detriment of Allied Irish Bank performed by John Rusnak. The aim of
the paper is twofold. On one side, the paper intends to show that the Secure Tropos concepts and
primitives are sufficient to capture high-level functional and security requirements. In particular,
the focus is on modeling the Allied Irish Bank’s policies (that should hold for every employee),
the role of Rusnak in First Maryland Bancorp’s organizations, and his personal relations with
the other employees in the bank, based on official documents (Promontory Financial Group
et al., 2003; United States Department of Justice, 2002). On the other side, the focus is on the
capabilities of Secure Tropos for detecting vulnerabilities that may affect the structure of an
organization and its information system. In particular, it is shown how vulnerabilities exploited
by Rusnak can be identified by comparing the structure of the organization with the concrete
instance of the organization. Within this paper, we want also to remark the importance of de-
tecting vulnerabilities during the early phases of the system development process. For instance,
Johnson applied violation and vulnerability analysis to the same case study for understanding
root causes of security incidents (Johnson, 2005). However, this kind of analysis can be used
only after the incident has happened.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly present
the case study. Then, we introduce Secure Tropos key functionalities (§3) and show how to
model the Allied Irish Bank’s organizational structure (§4) and how it has been modified after
John Rusnak’s hiring (§5). Then, we discuss the process for identifying potential conflicts in
organizations (§6). We check for conflicts in the requirements (§7) and discuss recommended
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structure after the fraud (§8). Finally, we discuss related work (§9), and conclude the paper with
some directions for future work (§10).
2 Case Study: John Rusnak and Allied Irish Banks
This section presents a scenario used as a running example throughout the paper. It is based on
a real case involving the loss of approximately $700 million in currency transactions from Allied
Irish Bank and its subsidiary First Maryland Bancorp (Promontory Financial Group et al., 2003;
Johnson, 2005; United States Department of Justice, 2002).
In 1983, Allied Irish Bank (AIB), the Republic of Ireland’s biggest banking and financial
services organization, acquired a stake in First Maryland Bancorp (Allfirst). In 1989, AIB
acquired Allfirst through a merger.
At the beginning, Allfirst currency trading was run only with limited risks and a limited
budget. In 1993, Allfirst recruited John Rusnak as currency trader. One reason behind his
recruitment was AIB and Allfirst’s desire to exploit a form of arbitrage in which Rusnak was
expert. This arbitrage played on the different exchange rates between currency options1 and
currency forwards.2 Rusnak’s strategy was based on complicated deals in the foreign exchange
and options markets. Unfortunately, his strategy did not work and he lost a substantial amount
of money. To cover the losses Rusnak started to play with Allfirst books and IT systems.
By exploiting weaknesses affecting Allfirst’s information system, Rusnak used a number of
methods not only to hide losses, but also to show he was gaining money. Essentially, he created
fake trades and entered them into Allfirst’s books. His scheme was to simultaneously enter pairs
of bogus trades into the trading system. One trade represented the sale of a currency option
to an Asian bank. The other trade represented the purchase of an offsetting option from the
same counterparty. Rusnak convinced and cajoled the back office employees (where the trades
are verified, as opposed to the front office, where the trades are made) that such trades did not
need to be confirmed because no cash had actually changed hands and because they should be
confirmed in the middle of the night. However, there was a difference between two trades: the
first option expired the day it was made, while the latter expired a month later. This scheme hid
1An option is an agreement that gives the buyer the right but not the obligation to buy or sell a currency at
a specified price on or before a specific future date. If it is exercised, the seller of the option must deliver the
currency at the specified price.
2A forward is a contract that obligates the contract holders to buy or sell the currency at a specified price, at
a specified quantity, and on a specified future date. These contracts cannot be transferred.
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the fact that he was operating over his trading limit, which allowed him to make more trades.
Moreover, these bogus options also disguised that he was taking high risks and actually losing
money.
The losses were uncovered during a management review of the treasury division of Allfirst
in 2001. An initial investigation at the back office revealed two trades supposedly made by
Rusnak that had not been confirmed. Then, the supervisor of Allfirst’s back office required an
explanation from its employees that reported Rusnak’s words. The supervisor didn’t like this.
Thus, he investigated further trades and found 12 unconfirmed deal tickets referring to recent
trades with Asian banks. All unconfirmed trades were given back to Rusnak. Moreover, when
the Asian banks were called, they knew nothing about the trades. The supervisor called Rusnak
reporting the troubles during the confirmation of these trades. Rusnak assured the supervisor
that he got confirmation of his trades. He copied the letterheads of Asian banks, typed bogus
confirmations of his trades, signed them, and given them to the back office.
The back-office supervisor did not like the look of documents given by Rusnak and wanted
additional confirmations by the involved Asian banks. It was Friday and the Asian markets were
closed until Sunday night. Rusnak said that he would give the number of a broker who could
confirm his trades to Allfirst on Sunday. Allfirst alerted the FBI after Mr Rusnak failed to come
to work on the next Monday.
Investigators considered this fraud a very complex crime for its sophisticated cover-up. If
found guilty, Rusnak could be sentenced to 30 years in prison and a $1 million fine. Yet, he is
not actually charged with theft, although prosecutors said he gained nearly $500,000 in bonuses
for fake bank profits (United States Department of Justice, 2002).
3 Secure Tropos
Secure Tropos (Giorgini et al., 2005a; Giorgini et al., 2005c) is an agent oriented requirements
engineering methodology, tailored to describe both the system-to-be and its environment with
respect to functional and security requirements.
This methodology uses the concepts of actor, goal, task, resource and social relations for
defining entitlements, capabilities and responsabilities of system’s actors. An actor is an active
entity that performs actions to achieve goals. Actors can be decomposed into sub-units for
modeling the internal structure of the actor itself while preserving the intentional abstraction of
the actor itself. Complex social actors can be modeled by using three types of sub-units: agents,
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Figure 1: Graphical Representation of Secure Tropos concepts
roles, and positions. An agent is an actor with concrete and physical manifestations, normally an
individual person or a concrete piece of running software. A role is an abstract characterization
of the behavior of a social actor with respect to a specific domain. A position represents a set of
roles played by an agent. In the remainder, an agent is said to occupy a position, while a position
to cover a role. A goal represents actors’ strategic interests. A task specifies a particular course
of actions that should be executed in order to satisfy a goal. A resource represents a physical
or an informational entity. In the remainder of the paper, for sake of simplicity, the notion of
service is used to refer to a goal, task, or resource. Figure 1 shows the graphical representation
of the above concepts.
Finally, Secure Tropos introduces social relations, namely objectives, ownership, provisioning,
(dis)trust, and delegation, for defining desires, entitlements, capabilities and responsabilities of
actors. Objectives of an actor are classic feature of a goal oriented methodology and we will not
discuss them further. The basic idea of ownership is that the owner of a service has full authority
concerning access and disposition of his service. In contrast, provisioning marks the actors who
have the capabilities to deliver a service. In order to verify the consistency among functional
and security requirements, it is essential to distinguish between relations involving permission
and relations involving execution. To this extent, the notions of delegation of permission and
delegation of execution have been introduced. Delegation of permission is used when in the
domain of analysis there is a formal passage of authority. In contrast, a delegation of execution
is used to model a delegation of responsabilities, that is, to model situations where the delegator
wants the delegatee to deliver a service since he has not the capability to deliver it by himself.
Example 1 Allfirst treasury office, who needs foreign exchange rates, delegate the execution of
the task of providing them to Reuters, a global information company. On the other hand, Allfirst
treasury office, who is the owner of the currency trading activities, delegates the permission to
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propose trades to the front office and to conclude trades to the back office.
Further, system designers might need to model systems where some actors must delegate
services to other actors they do not trust. Thus, it is convenient to separate the concept of trust
from the concept of delegation. Also in this case it is convenient to distinguish two notions of
trust: trust of permission and trust of execution. The meaning of trust of permission is that an
actor trusts that another actor will not misuse the permission on the service. The meaning of
trust of execution is that an actor trusts that another actor has the direct or indirect capability
to delivery the service. Many distributed domains also demand the possibility to make explicit
negative authorizations to help the designer in shaping the perimeter of positive authorizations.
So, the notion of distrust is introduced. As done for trust, the notion of distrust of permission is
separated from the notion distrust of execution. The occurrence of distrust of permission in the
model means that an actor believes that another actor may misuse a service, and the presence of
distrust of execution means that an actor believes that another actor may have not the capability
to delivery a service.
Different modeling activities contribute to the acquisition of a first requirement model, to its
refinement into subsequent models:
Actor modeling, which consists of identifying and analyzing both the actors of the environ-
ment and the system’s actors. Furthermore, this activity identifies actors which own ser-
vices and actors which have the capability to provide services beside the identification of
their objectives.
Trust modeling, which consists of identifying the trust (both of execution and permission)
relations among actors involved in the system.
Delegation (of execution) modeling, which consists of identifying actors which delegate to
other actors the execution of services.
Delegation (of permission) modeling, which consists of identifying actors which delegate
to other actors the permission on services.
Goal refinement, which consists of refining requirements. This activities is conducted from
the perspective of single actors by using AND/OR decomposition.
These modeling activities correspond to different kinds of actor diagrams: trust model, func-
tional requirements model, and trust management implementation. In these diagrams, actors are
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Figure 2: ST-Tool
represented as circles; goals, tasks and resources are respectively represented as ovals, hexagonous
and rectangles.
The Secure Tropos methodology is supported by ST-Tool,3 a CASE tool developed for aiding
designers during requirements modeling and verification phases. ST-Tool is composed of two
components: the ST-Tool kernel and one or more external solvers. The main component of
the ST-Tool kernel is the graphical user interface (Figure 2) through which all its components
are managed. This component allows designers to edit Secure Tropos models as graphs where
nodes are actors and services, and arcs are relationships. Further, it aims to manage graphical
objects. For instance, it supports the goal refinement phase by associating a goal diagram with
each actor. A second main component of the ST-Tool kernel provides support for automatic
transformations from Secure Tropos graphical models into Datalog and answer set programming
specifications (Leone et al., 2005) for formal analysis.
4 Applying Secure Tropos to the Case Study
This section presents an application of the modeling phases to the running example. First,
the actors of the environment and system’s actors are identified within their goals. Then, the
structure of the organization of AIB and Allfirst is analyzed by modeling the social relations
among actors.
3http://sesa.dit.unitn.it/sttool/
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4.1 Modeling Actors
The first activity in the early requirements phase is actor modeling. Below some of the stake-
holders belonging to the running example are listed.
Allied Irish Bank (AIB) is the Republic of Ireland’s biggest banking and financial services
organization. After merging with Allfirst, AIB allowed Allfirst a large amount of local
autonomy. Allfirst continued to have its own management team and board of directors.
However, AIB wanted to control Allfirst operations, and so it put one of its senior managers
as Allfirst Treasurer.
First Maryland Bancorp (Allfirst) is AIB subsidiary. For sake of simplicity, we take into ac-
count only Allfirst Treasury department. This department is managed by Allfirst Treasurer.
Allfirst’s treasury operations are divided into three areas and each of them is managed by
a specialized office:
Front office, which is responsible for treasury found management. This office is manage
by the Treasury Found Manager and includes Foreign Exchange Trading office where
Currency Traders work.
Middle office, which is responsible for liability and risk management. This office Risk
Control Group that was responsible for risk control.
Back office, which is responsible for treasury operations.
Last, but not least, a component of Allfirst is the DEVON System, Allfirst’s information
system. It was designed for providing trade entries and processing functionalities.
Foreign Trading Office represents the Treasury of banks with which Allfirst makes deals.
Reuters is a global information company providing information tailored for professionals in the
financial services, media and corporate markets.
Figure 3 shows the output of the actor modeling phases. In particular, the picture illustrates
the structure of the organization of AIB and Allfirst and the responsabilities of each actor.
4.2 Modelling Trust and Delegation
The requirements modelling phase proceeds introducing the social relations among actors in-
volved in the system and the consequent integration of security and functional requirements.
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Figure 3: AIB and Allfirst’s Organization
Figure 4 shows the relations among Front Office and Middle Office, and the other actors of
the system. In the picture, ownership relations are represented as edges between an actor and
a services labelled by O. Labels Te and Tp point trust of execution and trust of permission
relations, respectively. Then, label Dp is used to model the actual transfer of rights, and De to
model delegation of execution. Finally, distrust of execution and distrust of permission relations
are represented by using labels Se and Sp, respectively.
• Front Office was responsible for treasury funds management. This was decomposed into
four main operations, namely treasure funding, interest rate risk management, investment
portfolio management, and global trading (Promontory Financial Group et al., 2003, pag.
6).
• Currency Trader was appointed by Treasury Found Manager to perform currency trading
operations, a particular kind of global trading operations (Promontory Financial Group
et al., 2003, pag. 6).
• Currency Trader negotiated currency options and currency forwards with Foreign Trading
Office. Once the trader reached an agreement with the counterparty, he entered information
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Figure 4: Front and Middle Offices’ Organizational Structure
about transactions into the DEVON System (United States Department of Justice, 2002,
pag. 4).
• Middle Office was responsible for asset and liability management, financial analysis, and
risk control (Promontory Financial Group et al., 2003, pag. 6).
• Control Control Group was appointed by Middle Office Manager to perform risk control,
and in particular for Value at Risk4 computation, trading loss verification, and counterparty
credit verification (Promontory Financial Group et al., 2003, pag. 6).
• Employees in Treasury offices needed foreign exchange rates for performing their duties
and required these information to their own directors (Promontory Financial Group et al.,
4See (Jorion, 2000) for more details on Value at Risk.
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2003, pag. 16-18).
• In turn, Treasury office directors requested foreign exchange rates to Reuters (Promontory
Financial Group et al., 2003, pag. 16).
• However, Allfirst did not want to pay an additional fee (nearly $10,000 for each office), and
so Allfirst decided to download foreign exchange rates from Reuters onto the front office’s
server and then to copy them into the machines of other offices (Promontory Financial
Group et al., 2003, pag. 16).
• Then, each employee accessed the information system of the office in which was employed
for getting foreign exchange rates.
• Notice that Allfirst’s fund management policies required that Treasury offices performed
their duties by using prices obtained from sources independent of currency traders (Promon-
tory Financial Group et al., 2003, pag. 16). These policies imply the presence of a distrust
relation between Treasury offices and currency traders for providing foreign exchange rates.
• Control Control Group accessed the DEVON System in order to get information about
transactions made by traders for performing its duties and in particular for computing
Value at Risk (United States Department of Justice, 2002, pag. 5).
We now analyze the relations between the Back Office and the other actors.
• Back Office was responsible for ensuring effective controls on trading and ensuring prof-
itable trading. These operations was decomposed into sub goals and, in particular, ensuring
effective controls on trading was decomposed into confirming foreign exchanges and set-
ting foreign exchanges, and ensuring profitable trading into setting interest rate derivatives
trade and accounting for interest rate derivatives trade (Promontory Financial Group et al.,
2003, pag. 6).
• In order to achieve its duties Back Office needs some information. In particular, it requires
the list of tentative transactions for confirming foreign exchanges and setting foreign ex-
changes. So, Back Office accessed the DEVON System in order to get information about
transactions made by traders for confirming them (United States Department of Justice,
2002, pag. 4).
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Figure 5: Back Office’s Organizational Structure
• Back Office contacted Foreign Trading Office in order to confirm transactions (United
States Department of Justice, 2002, pag. 4-5).
• Allfirst Treasury policies required that all trades must be confirmed by Back Office (Promon-
tory Financial Group et al., 2003, pag. 15). In other words, the company (and thus the
Back Office) distrusts a Currency Trader to confirm his own transactions.
A graphical representation of requirements above is given in Figure 5.
5 Capturing the Position of Rusnak with Secure Tropos
This section presents the changes in Allfirst’s organization after Rusnak’s hiring. Figure 6
presents the obligations that Rusnak took in charge when he was employed.
• Rusnak was employed as currency trader by Allfirst. As employee, he was obligated to
behave honestly during the execution of his duties (United States Department of Justice,
2002, pag. 1).
• Furthermore, Rusnak was required by Allfirst to perform his duties in a way that should
gain reasonable profit for the bank itself without incurring unfounded risk (United States
Department of Justice, 2002, pag. 2).
13
Figure 6: Rusnak’s Recruitment Obligations
Figure 7: Allfirst’s Organization with Rusnak
• Finally, Rusnak was obligated to maintain accurate information about his trading activities
in the bank information system (United States Department of Justice, 2002, pag. 2, 5).
Figure 7 presents Allfirst’s organizational structure with Rusnak.
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• Rusnak convinced employees in Back Office to accept his own confirmations and not to
confirm some of his transactions by arguing that his counterparties were Asian banks and
employees must get up in the middle of the night in order to perform their duties and
by claiming that certain transactions did not require confirmation (Promontory Financial
Group et al., 2003, pag. 11, 15) (United States Department of Justice, 2002, pag. 7).
We summary these statements with a trust relation between Back Office employees and
Rusnak for confirming foreign exchanges.
• Allfirst did not want to pay for a dedicated Reuters feed to the back office. Rusnak argued
that he needed to continually monitor foreign exchange rates for checking his value at
risk. Thus, Allfirst analyst designed an architecture in which the Reuters feed was directly
downloaded onto Rusnak’s machine. Then, the Treasury offices got data from Rusnak’s
machine (Promontory Financial Group et al., 2003, pag. 16). This scenario implies a trust
relation between Treasury offices and Rusnak for providing exchanges rates.
6 Modeling and Detecting Conflicts
A critical phase of the system development process is the analysis of requirements in order to
detect the presence of conflicts (van Lamsweerde et al., 1998). More than often attackers exploit
vulnerabilities arising from conflicting requirements, rathen than break security mechanisms
themselves. We will show that this is also the case here.
A number of researchers classified conflicts among system requirements and to propose solu-
tions to mitigate them. Moffett et al. (Lupu and Sloman, 1999) have recognized two main classes
of conflicts: modality conflicts and conflicts of goals. Modality conflicts are defined as those con-
flicts that can be identified without a knowledge of the domain under analysis, while conflicts
of goals are defined as specific domain conflicts. The first class includes conflicts among au-
thorizations, among obligations, and among authorizations and obligations. The latter includes
conflicts of duties and conflicts of interest.
In (Giorgini et al., 2005a; Giorgini et al., 2005c) Secure Tropos focuses on modality conflicts.
Essentially, the authors have defined a set of properties in form of security patterns where
failure of such properties corresponds to presence of conflicting requirements and, consequently,
the presence of vulnerabilities in the system. For instance, the authors provided support for
verifying whether actors are confident that their objectives will be fulfilled and that their own
15
services will be not misused. It was also proposed to verify whether actors have enough rights
to delegate a service and whether actors that deliver a service are entitled to do this delivery.
Then, to avoid vulnerabilities arising from conflicting requirements may require either to modify
the structure of the organization or to introduce security mechanisms during the architectural
design phase.
However, this analysis is not sufficient for detecting all possible conflicts. In fact, we have
also recognized the importance of comparing the structure of the organization with the concrete
instance of the organization. This is crucial for capturing security requirements in a domain
where a trusted role can be played by an untrusted agent and vice versa. Thus, Secure Tropos
has been designed in order to support two different levels of analysis (Giorgini et al., 2005b):
social and individual. Social level analysis addresses to model the structure of organizations
by analyzing roles and positions of the organization. On the other side, in individual level the
focus is on single agents that are defined with their entitlements, objectives and responsibilities
together with the roles they play. This approach is based on the role-based access control
model (Sandhu et al., 1996) and takes advantage from specifying entitlements, objectives and
responsibilities into two steps: assignment of entitlements, objectives and responsibilities to roles,
and assignment of agents to roles. For instance, when new resources are entered into the system,
the administrator need only to decide which roles are entitled to access those resources. Then, all
agents that play those roles inherit access rights. This means that actors’ entitlements, objectives
and responsibilities propagate from social level to individual level. In order to cope with these
issues, we refined the requirements analysis by defining the following verification process:
1. design models at both social level and individual level, independently;
2. verify consistency of models at social level;
3. map models at social level into models at individual level;
4. verify consistency of models at individual level.
Here we have a challenge. Although visual modeling has been recognized as one of the
relevant aspects in Software Engineering to ease the understanding of requirements, graphical
models cannot be used for an accurate requirements verification. How do we know that the
actual, concrete instance of Allfirst organization does not present loopholes that Rusnak could
use?
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This concern has motivated the definition of a formal framework supporting the Secure
Tropos methodology based on Datalog (Leone et al., 2005). Essentially, the primitive Secure
Tropos concepts and relationships are modeled through Datalog predicates (Giorgini et al.,
2005a; Giorgini et al., 2005c). Unfortunately, the intuitive description of the system is usually
incomplete and cannot used to perform a correct analysis. Therefore, Secure Tropos distinguishes
two main types of predicates: intensional and extensional. Intuitively, extensional predicates
correspond to edges and nodes of the graphical model defined by the system designer, while
intensional predicates are specified by a security expert and derived by the reasoning system.
Once the designer has drawn up the model (i.e. the extensional predicates), the comprehensive
description of the system (i.e. the intensional predicates) is derived by using axioms.5 Then,
formal properties corresponding to specific security patterns are checked in order to verify the
consistency of the system requirements.
7 Tool Supported Conflict Analysis
The fraud designed by Rusnak exploited different weaknesses affecting Allfirst’s organizational
structure and its information system. According to US attorney Thomas M. DiBiagio, Rusnak
was motivated by different intents (United States Department of Justice, 2002, pag. 7):
• confirm his position in Allfirst by creating the sensation to gain profit for Allfirst itself;
• do not lose his employment because of huge loss;
• increase his salary with bonuses due to alleged profits.
Johnson have applied violation and vulnerability analysis (Johnson, 2005) to represent and
modeling the output of the investigation into the causes underlying Rusnak’s fraud. In particular,
Johnson recognized the failures in audit and control mechanisms, individual violations, and
the missed opportunities to detect Rusnak’s fraud. Here we propose to analyze the Allfirst’s
organizational structure in order to detect vulnerabilities during system development process.
This approach could allow to prevent attacks to the system.
This section provides an overview of the requirements verification process by using Secure
Tropos. In particular, we show how the Secure Tropos methodology can detect conflicting
requirements.
5See (Giorgini et al., 2005a; Giorgini et al., 2005c) for a complete list of axioms.
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7.1 Foreign Exchange Rates
A vulnerability was based on the lack of protection of the integrity of foreign exchange rates.
Conceptually, the policy on foreign exchange rates defined by Allfirst was correct: “foreign
currency rates are obtained independent of trading desk” (Promontory Financial Group et al.,
2003, pag. 16). However, Allfirst did not want to pay an additional fee to Reuters for a dedicated
connection for each of its offices. Furthermore, Rusnak argued that he needed such information
in real time in order to continually monitoring the value at risk of his trades. Thus, Allfirst
decided to develop an architecture in which rates were download on Rusnak’s machine, and then
the treasury offices got information from there.
Although Allfirst’s analysts noticed that “this is a failed procedure” and “technically, the
trader/s could manipulate the rates” (Promontory Financial Group et al., 2003, pag. 16), they
did not alert middle office and back office’s managers about their worries. Furthermore, this
procedure has downgrated the “control market risk” rating from “good” to “week”. However, the
“quality of risk management” rating (that includes the previous rating) has been only downgrated
to “acceptable” (Promontory Financial Group et al., 2003, pag. 17), and so no measure was
adopted in order to solve this situation.
As Allfirst’s analysts have outguessed, the rates spreadsheet was corrupt (Promontory Fi-
nancial Group et al., 2003, pag. 17). Essentially, Rusnak has manipulated the price associate
with yen and dollar in order to move around the loss limit imposed to him by Allfirst.
By looking at the models at social level and at individual level it is possible identify the
inconsistency between Allfirst’s policies and the concrete instance of the organization. In partic-
ular, we can see the presence of a distrust relation between treasury offices and currency traders
for providing foreign exchange rates at social level (Figure 4 and Figure 5), and the presence
of a trust relation between treasury offices and Rusnak for providing foreign exchange rates at
individual level (Figure 7). As presented in Section 6, the Secure Tropos requirements verifica-
tion process includes the mapping of the model at social level into the model at individual level,
and so the distrust relation involving currency trader is inherited by Rusnak. This allows the
reasoning system to easily detect the inconsistence.
7.2 Confirmation
The failure of confirmation of bogus options was one of the fundamental vulnerabilities exploited
by Rusnak. Allfirst defined a policy stating that every trade made by currency traders must be
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confirmed by back office. However, this policy was not implemented properly. Rusnak persuaded
some back office employees to not confirm all his transaction due to both the absence of cash
transfer and the time zone difference with his Asian alleged counterparties.
Bogus options were used by Rusnak for distorting the value at risk calculation. In particular,
they mitigated the risk associated with his real trades. Furthermore, Rusnak needed to find a
huge amount of cash to cover the losses of his real trading. So, he sold “deep-in-the-money”
options6 to different counterparties (Promontory Financial Group et al., 2003, pag. 11) (United
States Department of Justice, 2002, pag. 9). Then, Rusnak inserted into the trading system fake
options showing that the original option has been repurchased in order to cover his mounting
losses.
Once again, this vulnerability arise from the conflicts between Allfirst’s policies and the
concrete instance of the organization. In particular, back office distrusts currency traders for
confirming transactions (Figure 5), while back office trusts Rusnak for the same goal (Figure 7).
By mapping the social level into the individual level, the distrust relation involving currency
trader is inherited by Rusnak. Thus, the analysis reveals that Rusnak is at the same time
trusted and distrusted for confirming transaction by back office employees.
7.3 Middle Office vs Back Office
The lack of interaction between Middle Office and Back Office was part of the set of vulnerabilities
exploited by Rusnak. The Middle Office computed the value at risk on tentative trades instead
of considering trades confirmed by Back Office. Thus, Rusnak was able to tamper value at risk
by introducing bogus options in the list of tentative transactions.
The analysis does not reveal this vulnerability since it is conceptually embedded into the
system requirements. However, we have not modeled the code of practice for financial market
(Association Cambiste Internationale, 2005) and the trust/distrust relations that are proper to
this model. Therefore, it might be that this loophole could have been captured by modeling the
proper path of delegation of execution and trust and the corresponding mismatch of Allfirst’s
organizational structure.
However, by looking at the models in Figure 4 and Figure 5 it is evident the lack of relations
between the two treasury offices. In particular, Figure 7 clearly shows that Rusnak controlled
6A “deep-in-the-money” option is an option with a price that is significantly below the market price and had
large premium.
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Figure 8: Distribution of foreign exchange rates
the information that the two offices used to perform their duties.
8 Updated Model
After the fraud was discovered, AIB appointed Promontory Financial Group for an independent
review of its internal control and risk management system. Promontory Financial Group together
with the law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Kats analyzed AIB and Allfirst’s organization
and identified numerous deficiencies in the control structures at Allfirst. The vulnerabilities that
we have shown in the previous section and other vulnerabilities together with some suggestions
for coping with them were explained in the “Ludwig report”7 (Promontory Financial Group
et al., 2003).
Promontory Financial Group’s suggestions mainly focus on the attention that AIB and All-
first should take on policies and procedures. In particular, reviewers revealed that treasury staff
was enough not expert to fulfill its duties. So, Promontory Financial Group (2003) suggested to
retrain the current staff or to replace it with skilled personnel. This confirms the importance of
analyzing the concrete instance of a organization together with its structure. Additional support
to this thesis comes from recent studies (Ponemon, 2003) that reveal that information security
administrators’ biggest worry is employee negligence and abuse.
Promontory Financial Group (2003) pointed out a single suggestion concerning Allfirst’s
organizational structure: the distribution of foreign exchange rates. Following the “Ludwig
report”, Allfirst decided to pay for a dedicated Reuters feed to the Middle and Back offices in
order to decrease fraud risk. Figure 8 presents the new configuration for distributing foreign
7The Promontory Financial Group’s report was called “Ludwig report” from Eugene Ludwig, the former
currency controller who has written the report.
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exchange rates among treasury offices. We argue that this is not the only solution in order to
guarantee the integrity of foreign exchange rates. For instance, Allfirst could require to Reuters a
message authentication code (MAC) together the data itself. Then, treasury offices have to check
the integrity of data before using them. This solution could allow Allfirst to avoid a dedicated
connection between Reuters and every treasury office and consequently to save money.
9 Related Work
Several research efforts have addressed the issue of integrating security into the system develop-
ment process. They focus on very different aspects, from design of access control mechanisms
to modelling the behavior a system should avoid, from the definition of principles for conflict
analysis and classification to the definition of security patterns.
Several proposals try to integrate access control models into Software Engineering by using
or enhancing UML constructs (Doan et al., 2004; Lodderstedt et al., 2002; Ray et al., 2004; Shin
and Ahn, 2000). Proposals for specifying and enforcing access control policies can be classified
under three main classes: discretionary access control (DAC) (Downs et al., 1985), mandatory
access control (MAC) (Bell and LaPadula, 1976), and role based access control (RBAC) (Sandhu
et al., 1996). Many approaches try to capture these models in the UML language to reduce a
gap between security models and system developments. For instance, Doan et al. (2004) propose
to incorporate the MAC model into UML, while Shin et al. (2000) focus on the RBAC model.
Lodderstedt et al. (2002) proposed SecureUML, a modeling language designed for integrating
RBAC policies into a model-driven software development process. Ray et al. (2004) propose to
integrate RBAC in UML as a pattern by using diagram template, and express RBAC constraints
through the Object Constraint Language. However, these proposals focus only on the information
system and the access control mechanisms supported by the information system itself.
Other approaches proposed to explicitly model behaviors that the system should avoid (Mc-
Dermott and Fox, 1999; Sindre and Opdahl, 2005; van Lamsweerde et al., 2003). McDermott
and Fox (1999) define abuse cases as interactions between a system and one or more actors,
where the results of the interactions are harmful to the system, or one of the stakeholders of
the system. Guttorm and Opdahl (2005) define misuse cases, the inverse of UML use cases,
which describe functions that the system should not allow. This approach is also adopted by
van Lamsweerde et al. (2003) that extend the KAOS methodology (Dardenne et al., 1993) by
introducing the notion of anti-goals as the objectives of attackers.
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Regarding the conflict analysis, some guidelines providing support for detecting and miti-
gating conflicts among requirements and policies are emerging (Bandara et al., 2003; Lupu and
Sloman, 1999; van Lamsweerde et al., 1998). For instance, Lupu et al. (1999) propose to use
policies overlapping techniques in order detect conflicts among policies. Bandera et al. (2003)
define a formal framework based on Event Calculus in order to support this approach. Essen-
tially, they represent conflicts by constraints on events, and then simulate the system behavior
through sequences of events and detect policy inconsistencies by identifying the situations in
which conflicts occur. We differ from this approach since we aim at understanding why a system
should comply with such constraints.
van Lamsweerde et al. (1998) proposed formal techniques for detecting conflicting formu-
lations of goals and requirements among different stakeholder viewpoints. In particular, they
suggested various techniques for systematically resolving conflicts by introducing new goals or
by transforming the specification of goals towards models that are not affected by conflicts.
Security engineering with patterns is recently becoming a hot topic of research (Cheng et al.,
2003; Priebe et al., 2004; Schumacher, 2003; Schumacher et al., 2005; The Open Group, 2004).
Security patterns have been proposed in order to assist in identifying and formulating security
measures that are relevant to system development. They provide ad-hoc solutions in systematic
and structured manner. Essentially, security patterns are security best practices presented in
a template format. This format aids designers in identifying and understanding security con-
cerns, and in implementing appropriate security measures even if they are not security experts
(Schumacher, 2003). Currently, many efforts are addressed to the definition of a template for
security patterns that is tailored to integrate security and systems engineering (Cheng et al.,
2003; Schumacher, 2003; The Open Group, 2004). In particular, many solutions propose to use
UML to represent structural and behavioral aspects of design.
10 Conclusion
The last years have seen a major interest for software engineering methodologies that could
capture security concerns. We have proposed Secure Tropos, a methodology tailored to deal
with trust and security requirements from the very early stage of design. We have shown over
a complex case study the effectiveness of Secure Tropos in order to detect modality conflicts
among high-level functional and security requirements. The next step is to provide automatic
mechanisms also for detecting conflicts between goals such as conflicts of duties and conflicts of
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interests.
A more ambitious objective now is to move towards architectural design. After a preliminary
analysis, we have recognized the potential of security patterns approaches (Schumacher, 2003;
Schumacher et al., 2005) for dealing with this issue. Thus, we are currently defining a security
pattern repository based on Secure Tropos and general schemes for representing structural and
behavioral aspects of design into UML-based frameworks for security (Lodderstedt et al., 2002;
McDermott and Fox, 1999; Sindre and Opdahl, 2005).
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